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A. Minnesota Supreme Court Limits Grandparents' Visitation Rights'
The Santoro case involved the adoption and visitation rights of
two children, A.B. born on March 30, 1983, and N.B. born on
2December 20, 1984. Their parents, Lisa and Michael Borgstrom,
were killed in an automobile accident on September 18, 1987,
when the children were four and two years old respectively.3 On
October 28, 1987, the court appointed the children's paternal
grandparents, Stella and Kenneth Borgstrom, as the children's• 4
guardians. Approximately five years later, when the children were
nine and seven years old, the Borgstroms legally adopted the
children.5
Prior to their deaths, Lisa and Michael Borgstrom were not
close with Lisa's parents, Louis and Carole Santoro. Nevertheless,
Lisa, Michael and their children still spent occasional family
holidays with the Santoros." In 1986, this occasional gathering
ended when Lisa's younger sister, Elizabeth Santoro, alleged that
7Carole Santoro had abused her. After Elizabeth left her parents'
home on Thanksgiving Day of 1986 to live with Michael and Lisa,
Louis and Carole Santoro severed all ties with their daughter Lisa
despite Lisa's repeated attempts to contact her parents by
1. See In re Santoro, 594 N.W.2d 174, 175 (Minn. 1999). The U.S. Supreme
Court recently addressed the issue of grandparent visitation rights in the context
of a Washington state statute. See Troxel v. Granville, _ S. Ct. _, 2000 WL
712807 (U.S. June 5, 2000). The Court found that the Washington statute swept
too broadly and violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive
due process. See id. at *5-8. In addition, the Court specifically referenced the
Minnesota Statute at issue in Santoro as an example of a statute that accorded
protection for a parent's unconsitutional right to make decisions regarding the
upbringing of his or her children. See id. at *8 (citing MINN. STAT. §
257.022(2) (a) (2) (1998)).
2. See Santoro, 594 N.W.2d at 175.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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8telephone. Louis and Carole Santoro had no contact with Lisa,
Michael or their children before Lisa's and Michael's deaths in
1987.'
During the guardianship hearing in 1987, Louis and Carole
Santoro requested visitation rights.' Kenneth Borgstrom told
Carole Santoro that he would not allow the children to visit the
Santoros unless he was physically present.11 Because the Santoros
claimed they could not afford an attorney at the time, they
declined to pursue their visitation rights any further than their
original request.
2
The Santoros asserted to the trial court that they had
attempted to keep in contact with the children by phone calls and
monthly letters beginning immediately after Lisa and Michael's
deaths. 3 Nevertheless, the Borgstroms alleged that the Santoros
did not attempt to contact the children until four years later, in
April of 1991, when the Borgstroms received mail for the children
from the Santoros.14 The Borgstroms admitted that they returned
this mail unopened to the Santoros.
15
On September 26, 1994, the Santoros filed a petition for
visitation 6 pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 257.022, which
states in part, that grandparents "may be granted reasonable
visitation rights... upon finding that visitation rights would be in
the best interests of the child and would not interfere with the
parent child relationship. 17 The statute mandates that the court
8. See id. This was not the first sign of the tumultuousness of the
relationship between Lisa Borgstrom and her parents, Louis and Carole Santoro.
See id. When Lisa was 16 years old, she also ran away from home and requested to
be placed in foster care. See id. Lisa told her foster mother, and later told Stella
and Kenneth Borgstrom, that her parents had physically abused her. See id. In
addition, Lisa told the Borgstroms that she did not want her parents to have





13. See id. at 175.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 176.
17. MINN. STAT. § 257.022, subd. 1 (1998). The statute provides:
If a parent of an unmarried minor child is deceased, the parents... of
the deceased parent may be granted reasonable visitation rights to the
unmarried minor child during minority by the district court upon
finding that visitation rights would be in the best interests of the child
1312 [Vol. 26:4
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"consider the amount of personal contact between the parents...
of the deceased parent and the child prior to the application. " "
On August 2, 1995, the trial court ordered supervised visitation
for the Santoros.i9 The court also appointed a guardian ad litem
who would file a report on the Santoros' home environment. °
Before the guardian ad litem filed a report, the court held another
hearing on June 26, 1996 during which set it out a supervised
visitation schedule.2'
From August of 1995 through September of 1996, the Santoros
had ten visits with their grandchildren.22 These visits ended in
September of 1996 when the younger of Lisa and Michael's
children, N.B., allegedly ran away to avoid visiting with the
Santoros. 3
Shortly after this incident, the Borgstroms produced a written
statement by A.B. and an affidavit from N.B. requesting that the
24children not be required to visit with the Santoros. On October
25
29, 1996, the trial court appointed an attorney for the children.
The attorney submitted two letters and a Memorandum of Law on
Behalf of the Children urging the court to release the children
from the visitation schedule.
26
On April 17, 1997, the trial court held a hearing to determine
if it was appropriate to continue the visitation against the wishes of
the children. Both children testified that they did not want to
and would not interfere with the parent child relationship. The court
shall consider the amount of personal contact between the parents ... of
the deceased parent and the child prior to the application.
Id.
18. Id.
19. See Santoro, 594 N.W.2d at 176.
20. See id. After this report was filed, the court stated that it would allow the






26. See id. The Memorandum of Law alleged the following: 1) that the
children did not want to have contact with the Santoros; 2) that there was little
indication that the guardian ad litem had paid credence to the children's thoughts
and concerns in making his recommendations; and 3) that the Santoros had not
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continue to see the Santoros.'8 The guardian ad litem also testified,
alleging that "the Borgstroms were hostile to him, were not
supportive of visitation, influenced the children's opinions of the
Santoros by talking about them in front of the children, and
coached the children to make disparaging statements about the
visitation." 2 The guardian ad litem ended his testimony by stating
that the Santoros were "good people today" and that visitation
would be in the best interests of the children. °
On July 25, 1997, the trial court issued its final order, stating
that the Borgstroms had "actively, vindictively, and without reason
obstructed any contact whatsoever between the Santoros and the
minor children" and that the Borgstroms' anger toward the
Santoros was unfounded but "likely to continue to the detriment of
the minor children."31 The court concluded that visitation was in
the best interests of the children and would not interfere with the
parent child relationshiR as mandated by Minnesota Statute section
257.022, subdivision 1. The Borgstroms appealed and in 1998,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in granting visitation rights to the Santoros.33
The Borgstroms appealed again and the Minnesota Supreme Court
granted their petition for review.3
4
The court began its discussion of the Santoro decision by
emphasizing the grave consequences of children "becom[ing]
pawns in the wars of adults." 5 The court then turned its attention
28. See id. At the time of the hearing, A.B. was 14 years old and N.B. was 12
years old. See id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 177. The guardian ad litem also admitted that he had little
familiarity with the children's home and school lives. See id.
31. Id.
32. See id. In the final written argument to the court, the Borgstroms alleged
that Minnesota Statute section 257.022 was unconstitutional because it violated the
due process, privacy, and equal protection clauses. See id. The trial court declined
to hear this argument and the Borgstroms did not raise it on appeal. See id. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding of constitutionality
in Petition of Santoro, 578 N.W.2d 369, 376-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). However,
because of the manner in which the Minnesota Supreme Court decided the
Santoro case, the court never had to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the
statute. See Santoro, 594 N.W.2d at 177, 179.
33. See Santoro, 594 N.W.2d at 177. The court of appeals based its decision
mostly on the Borgstroms' interference with the Santoros' visitation fights. See id.;
see also Petition of Santoro, 578 N.W.2d at 376-77.
34. See Santoro, 594 N.W.2d at 177.
35. See id. The court wrote that "it is difficult to adjudicate with the wisdom of
King Solomon when both parties are willing to split the baby." Id. (citing I Kings
1314 [Vol. 26:4
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to Minnesota statute section 257.022 and its statutory "best
interests" factors.3 6 First, the court noted that according to the
language of the statute, the trial court is supposed to consider two
factors in determining the "best interests" of the child3 7 These
factors are (1) the amount of contact between the grandparents
and the children and (2) the reasonable preference of the
children. 8
The court then continued its discussion by admonishing the
trial court for concentrating "almost exclusively" on the
Borgstroms' conduct and "made only conclusory statements that
the children's best interests would be served by visitation."3 9 The
Court noted that the trial court "neglect[ed]" the other express,
statutory considerations in making its conclusions. 0
Next, the court applied the statutory factors in order to
41determine the best interests of N.B. and A.B. It noted that despite
the possibility of the Borgstroms trying to prevent the Santoros
from contacting the children, the record showed at least a four-year
gap and most likely a seven-year gap in the contact between the
Santoros and the children.4 2 In addition, the children themselves
had expressed their desire not to continue visitation.43
Finally, the Court concluded that due to the trial court's lack
of findings on the statutory "best interest" factors, the gap in the
amount of contact time between the children and the Santoros,
3:16-28). The court also criticized both sets of grandparents for neglecting the
children and "refus[ing] to bow to the children's desire and need for stability." See
id.
36. See id.
37. See id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 257.022, subd.1 (1998).
38. See Santoro, 594 N.W.2d at 177-78; see also MINN. STAT. § 257.022, subd. 1.
39. Santoro, 594 N.W.2d at 178 (noting that the trial court should have placed
more weight on the statutory mandate of considering the lapse of time between
contact with the children and the application for visitation).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. The Santoros last saw the children prior to court-ordered visitation
in November 1986. See id. at 175. The Santoros kept letters that they sent to the
children and that were returned by the Borgstroms, which were dated April 1991,
four years after the last time they had seen their children. See id. The Santoros
did not file the petition for visitation rights until seven years after they had last
seen the children, in September 1994. See id. at 176. Although the Santoros
contend that they did send letters earlier and that they attempted to make phone
calls, they had no evidence to substantiate this claim. See id. at 175-76.
43. See id at 178-79. The court noted that trial courts have often relied on the
preferences of children as young as 11 years old, and that A.B. and N.B. are now
16 and 14 years old respectively. See id. at 178.
20001 1315
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and the children's expressed preferences, it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to order that the children continue
the visitation with the Santoros.44
Justice Page, dissenting, chastised the majority for failing to
"give guidance to [the] lower courts and the practicing bar to assist
them in determining what constitutes the best interests of the45
child" in grandparent visitation cases. He argued that the
majority "g[ave] lip service to the requirements of section 257.022,
subd. 1 and then substitute[d] its judgment for that of the trial
court."
4 6
The dissent asserted that the issue to be decided is "whether
reasonable visitation between A.B. and N.B. and their maternal
grandparents, the Santoros, is in A.B. and N.B.'s best interest.
4 7
Justice Page argued that the test is whether the visitation with the
Santoros will provide some benefit to A.B. and N.B. and will not
481have some other negative impact on the children.
In the remainder of the dissent, Justice Page attacked the
reasoning behind the majority's opinion.4 " First, he argued that the
majority "fail [ed] to explain what it is about the gap in contact that
warrants denying visitation altogether. '50  Second, Justice Page
stated that the preferences of the children "should not be
considered in a vacuum" and must be examined in light of the
Borgstroms' conduct.5' Finally, the dissent criticized the court for
articulating a rule that both "eviscerates" the grandparent visitation
statute and "provides a roadmap of how to close the door on
grandparents who, absent the obstructionist conduct of the
custodial parents, would otherwise be legally entitled to
visitation. The dissent concluded by stating that the Borgstroms'
44. See id. at 179. In so ruling, the court noted that it did not have to address
the constitutionality of the statute at issue. See id.




49. See id. at 180-81.
50. Id. at 180 (stating that majority's reasoning, that due to a lengthy gap in
conduct, visitation is per se not in the children's best interest, is unwarranted).
51. See id. (pointing out that the trial court had found that "[a]ll attempts at
contact between the children and the [Santoros] were thwarted by the
Borgstroms").
52. See id. at 181 (stating that the majority effectively rewarded the
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conduct would never be "in any child's best interest.
5
1
B. Minnesota Supreme Court Holds that Parents May Not Alter Statutory
Endangerment Standard in a Marital Termination Agreemen?
4
Sherrie Giese and Ronald Frauenshuh were married in
October 1986 and their son Logan was born in March 1991.55 In
November 1994, when Logan was three years old, the parties
divorced and entered into a stipulated marital termination
agreement (MTA) . The MTA granted sole physical custody57 to
Giese but granted both Giese and Frauenshuh joint legal custody.5"
The MTA also stated that Minnesota Statute section 518.18,59 the
modification statute, shall not be applicable for a modification " [i]f
either party shall move a distance greater than fifty (50) miles.
Under this circumstance, the best interest of the child will be
thoroughly examined pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.17.
"
,61
In August 1996, Giese notified Frauenshuh that she had
obtained new employment and was moving with Logan from
Ortonville to Cambridge, a 150-mile move.6 Frauenshuh brought a
motion for modification of the MTA's physical custody provision
and the parties engaged in a three-year battle in the courts before
the Minnesota Supreme Court heard the case.
53. Id.
54. See Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 1999).
55. See id. at 154.
56. See id. (noting that while Frauenshuh was represented by counsel during
divorce proceedings, Giese was not).
57. See id. Minnesota Statute section 518.003 defines "physical custody and
residence" as "the routine daily care and control and the residence of the child."
MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 3(c) (1998).
58. See Frauenshuh, 599 N.W.2d at 154-55. Minnesota Statute section 518.003
defines "joint legal custody" as "both parents hav[ing] equal rights and
responsibilities, including the right to participate in major decisions determining
the child's upbringing, including education, health care, and religious training."
MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 3(b).
59. See Frauenshuh, 599 N.W.2d at 155; see also MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d).
60. Frauenshuh, 599 N.W.2d at 155.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 155-56. At the first district court hearing, the district court relied
on the "endangerment standard" found in Minnesota Statute section 518.18 and
rejected the "best interests" standard of Minnesota Statute section 518.17, which
was the standard stipulated to in the MTA. See id. at 155. The district court found
that there was no evidence showing that Logan's environment was endangering
his physical or emotional development. See id. Frauenshuh appealed and the
court of appeals remanded the case to district court, instructing the court to apply
the best interests standard stipulated to by the parties in the MTA. See Frauenshuh
20001 1317
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The majority began its discussion by setting out its limited
63standard of review. It stated that an appellate court will not
reverse a lower court's custody determination unless "the district
court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the
evidence or by improperly applying the law."
The court then set out the requirements for modification of
physical custody under Minnesota Statute section 518.18, as follows:
A party seeking modification of physical custody under
subdivision (iii) must establish four elements to make a
prima facie case for modification: (1) circumstances have
changed involving the child or custodial parent; (2) the
modification would be in the best interests of the child;
(3) the child's physical or emotional health or emotional
development is endangered by his or her present
environment; and (4) the harm associated with the
proposed change in custody would be outweighed by the
benefits of the change.65
In addition, the court noted that the legislature provided
different standards for cases involving joint physical custody and
cases involving sole physical custody. The legislature specifically
provided where joint physical custody has been awarded, the
parties are free to determine their own standard for modification
of the custodial agreement, which will be binding on the courts.
67
v. Giese, No. C8-96-2609, 1997 WL 275002, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 27, 1997).
On remand, the district court held that "(1) It [wa]s in Logan's best interest to
reside with [Giese] in Ortonville, MN; (2) In the event #1 above is not a possibility,
it is in Logan's best interests to reside in Ortonville, MN with [Frauenshuh]."
Frauenshuh, 599 N.W.2d at 156. However, the court stayed this order pending
appeal. See id. Finally, Giese appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's order. See Frauenshuh v. Giese, No. C8-98-444, 1998 WL 481890, at
*4 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1998), rev'd, Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 NW.2d 133
(Minn. 1999).
63. See Frauenshuh, 599 N.W.2d at 156.
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. See id. at 157; see also MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (1998).
66. See Frauenshuh, 599 N.W.2d at 157.
67. Id. at 157-58. Minnesota Statute section 518.18(e) provides:
In deciding whether to modify a prior joint custody order, the court shall
apply the standards set forth in paragraph (d) unless: (1) the parties
agree in writing to the application of a different standard, or (2) the
party seeking the modification is asking the court for permission to move
the residence of the child to another state.
1318 [Vol. 26:4
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In the case of sole physical custody situations however, the
legislature did not enact any comparable provision allowing the
parties to agree to different modification standards.6s As a result,
the majority concluded that the legislature intended to treat these
custody situations differently.
69
The court concluded that Minnesota Statute section 518.15
unambiguously mandates that the "endangerment standard" is to
be applied in situations involving a modification of a sole physical
custody award. 0 As a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court found
that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in remanding the
case to the district court for use of the "best interests" standard.71
The district court correctly applied the "endangerment" standard
as enunciated in Minnesota Statute section 518.18.71
Three justices dissented v.7  The dissent disagreed with the
majority's reasoning, arguing that the majority disregarded
74precedent and ignored the equities involved in the case.
First, the dissent pointed out that "stipulations are heavily
favored in dissolution and custody proceedings."75  The dissent
quoted the court's previous decision in Ayers v. Ayers in stating that
"[c]ustody provisions contained in a stipulated decree must be
accorded a good deal of deference, in that they represent the terms
specifically agreed to by the parties and adopted by the court."
76
The dissent accused the majority of "paying lip service" to this
precedent before disregarding the stipulation entered into between
MINN. STAT. § 518.18(e).




72. See id. at 155. The court did acknowledge the "importance of stipulations
as a means for resolving marital dissolutions and in no way s[ought] to discourage
the creative and amicable resolution of these cases . . . ." Id. at 158. But the court
said that it would not "allow parties to contravene the plain and unambiguous
intent of the legislature to provide permanence and closure in child custody
matters." Id. The court refused to "equate decisions regarding child custody with
decisions regarding property" when it stated, "[i] t is one thing to hold for another
day issues related to money or property of a party; it is quite another to permit a
stipulation which effectively holds for another day the decision of who has custody
of a child." Id. at 159.
73. See id. at 159-61 (Gilbert, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Page and
Stringer).
74. See id. at 159-60.
75. Id. at 159.
76. Id. at 159 (citing Ayers v. Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 520 (Minn. 1993)).
2000] 1319
9
Nelsen: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Family Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
the parties in this case.77
Next, the dissent discussed the equities involved in the case."'
First, it accused the majority of "effectively... permitting Giese to
unilaterally modify and eliminate an express condition" of the
parties' custody agreement, which in turn undermines the parties'
"well-settled rights and expectations. ' 79 Second, the dissent argued
that the majority "fail[ed] to incorporate, and may in fact [have]
violate[d], the best interests of the parties' minor child"8 ° by
"elevat[ing] a boilerplate standard... ahead of what has been
determined to be in the best interest of the child in this particular
case."'81 Finally, the dissent stated that the majority has abrogated
the parents' rights to determine the factors that are "most
important to the well-being of their child."82 In sum, the dissent
chastised the court for engaging in "micromanaging family
relationships" when it should be "applaud[ing] [parents] for
placing their child's interests above their own in dissolution and
post-dissolution proceedings. ''8'
C. Minnesota Supreme Court Finds that Administrative Child Support
Statute is Unconstitutiona 4
In 1984, Congress mandated that the states create expedited
administrative and judicial procedures for the distribution and
enforcement of child support orders.8 ' Despite the fact that
Minnesota counties were originally exempted from some of the
federal mandates, the state decided to implement a pilot program
in 1988 in Dakota County designed to improve child support
administration and enforcement in matters involving public
authority.86
77. See id.
78. See id. at 159-61.




83. Id. at 160-61.
84. See Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 720 (Minn. 1999)
[hereinafter Holmberg I]. One Minnesota case has distinguished the Holmberg H
decision because of its prospective application. See Nash-Kadechka v. Kadechka,
1999 WL 343863, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 1, 1999).
85. See Holmberg II, 588 N.W.2d at 722; see also 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2) (1994).
86. See Holmberg II, 588 N.W.2d at 722. This pilot program provided that
administrative law judges from the Office of Administrative Hearings presided
over child support hearings when the Dakota County human services department
1320 (Vol. 26:4
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Due in part to the success of Dakota County's pilot program,
the Minnesota legislature expanded the reach of the administrative
hearings and implemented a more expansive program for several
87Minnesota counties in 1989. As part of this more expansive
program, administrative lawjudges had the ability to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law, issue final decisions without a review
by the chief administrative law judge, and hear uncontested
parentage cases. In 1990, the legislature changed the process by
mandating that orders by an administrative law judge could be
appealed to the court of appeals in the same manner as district
court opinions, instead of by writ of certiorari as previously
provided in the pilot program. 8" By 1995, the Minnesota legislature
required all counties to implement administrative programs to
resolve child support matters where the county was either a party to
the action or represented a party to the action.
As part of the then statewide program, matters were dividedS 91
into contested and uncontested proceedings. If a matter was an
uncontested proceeding, the public authority issued a written
notice to the parties requesting information to prepare a child
support order and the parties were given thirty days to respond.92
The public authority prepared the order for the parties to sign and
for the administrative law judge to ratify.
3
If either party contested the child support order prepared by
the public authority and ratified by the administrative law judge,
either was a party to the action or represented a party to the action. See MINN.
STAT. § 518.551, subd. 10 (Supp. 1987). Administrative law judges were
empowered to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations,
but only the chief administrative law judge was allowed to render final decisions
and orders. See id. Final orders could be appealed to the court of appeals by writ
of certiorari. See id. The statute also authorized non-attorney Dakota County
employees, called child support officers, to prepare motions, medical support
orders and related documents and to participate in hearings before the
administrative lawjudge. See id.; see also Holmberg II, 588 N.W.2d at 722.
87. See Holmberg II, 588 N.W.2d at 722. The federal government also played a
part in the Minnesota's decision to implement a more broad administrative
procedure. The federal government withdrew from sixteen Minnesota counties





92. See MINN. STAT. § 518.5511, subd. 2 (1996); see also Holmberg II, 588
N.W.2d at 722.
93. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
20001 1321
11
Nelsen: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Family Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
then the matter became part of the contested hearing process.94 As
part of the contested hearing process, child support officers, non-
attorney county employees, drew up pleadings and appeared at
hearings without the supervision of an attorney.95  During the
administrative law hearings, administrative law judges had "all
powers, duties, and responsibilities conferred on judges of district
court to obtain and enforce child and medical support and
parentage and maintenance obligations.
Three child support obligors filed post judgment petitions for
review of administrative law judges' granting of awards of child
support, arguing that process mandated in Minnesota StatuteS 97
section 518.5511 violated the separation of powers doctrine. The
obligors alleged that the process impinged upon the original
jurisdiction of the district court, created a tribunal that was not
inferior to the district court, and permitted child support officers
to engage in the practice of law. 98 The court of appeals held that
the process did violate the separation of powers and the Minnesota
Supreme Court granted a limited review of the constitutional issues
raised by the administrative process.99
The court began its analysis by discussing the history and
origin of the separation of powers doctrine.00  Minnesota's
embodiment of the separation of powers doctrine appears in
Article VI of the state constitution, which gives district courts
original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases."'
94. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
95. SeeMINN. STAT. § 518.5511, subd. 5 (1996).
96. Id. This power includes the power to issue subpoenas, conduct
proceedings, and issue warrants for failure to appear. See id.
97. See Holmberg v. Holmberg, 578 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
[hereinafter Holmberg I].
98. See Holmberg I, 588 N.W.2d at 723.
99. See id. The court of appeals held that the child support administrative
process violated the separation of powers doctrine (1) because it allowed
administrative law judges to make decisions that were not reviewable by the district
courts; and (2) because it permitted direct appeal to the court of appeals rather
than by writ of certiorari. See id. The appellate court stated that the process
placed administrative law judges "in the constitutionally untenable position of
reviewing and modifyingjudicial decisions." Holmberg 1, 578 N.W.2d at 821; see also
Holmberg 11, 588 N.W.2d at 723.
100. See Holmberg II, 588 N.W.2d at 723-24.
101. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1 and 3. Article VI, section 1 states in part,
"[t] he judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, a court of appeals, if
established by the legislature, a district court and such other courts, judicial
officers and commissioners with jurisdiction inferior to the district court as the
legislature may establish." MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
[Vol. 26:41322
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The court discussed the Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals case in
which the statutory creation of a tax court was upheld against a
separation of powers challenge because "taxation is primarily a
legislative function, and the steps taken under the authority of theS,,102
legislature are administrative in character. The court noted that
the functions of the tax court were "not judicial" in the strict103
sense. The court pointed out that the child support
administration statute was entirely different from the tax court
creation because it "encompasse[d] an area of law [that] arises in
equity.",0 4  Family-related decisions "rely on the district court's
inherent equitable powers" and as a result, the child support
administrative process required "close scrutiny.,
0 5
In applying close scrutiny, the court found several "grave
separation of powers concerns. 10 6 First, the legislature delegated
the district court's inherent equitable power to the Office of
Administrative Hearings, an executive agency. °7  Second, the
delegation infringed on the district court's original jurisdiction
because (1) the process is mandatory for many parties, thereby. . .. . 108
removing a class of cases from the district court's jurisdiction, (2)
administrative law judges' orders are given the same deference as
district court orders because they could be appealed by right,' and
(3) administrative law judges are given the power to modify district
court decisions."0 Finally, the court also came to the "inescapable
conclusion" that child support officers were practicing law because
of their authority to draft pleadings and represent public authority
without attorney supervision. As a result, the court determined
102. Holmberg I, 588 N.W.2d at 723; see also Wulffv. Tax Court of Appeals, 288
N.W.2d 221, 222-23 (Minn. 1979).
103. See Holmberg II, 588 N.W.2d at 723; Wulff 288 N.W.2d at 224.
104. Holmberg I, 588 N.W.2d at 724.
105. Id. The court also noted that the Nebraska Supreme Court struck down a
similar expedited child support process because the court found that the process
infringed on the district court's inherent equitable jurisdiction. See id. (citing
Drennen v. Drennen, 426 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Neb. 1988)).
106. Id. at 725-26.
107. See id. at 725-26.
108. See id. at 724.
109. See id. at 725.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 726. The court noted that it is the courts themselves who have
the power to regulate the practice of law "to maintain discipline over attorneys and
to protect the public." Id. Despite the appellant's argument that the child
support process encourages efficiency, the court said that it could not "sacrifice its
supervisory powers in the pursuit of efficiency." Id.
20001 1323
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that the child support administration process violated the
separation of powers and was thus unconstitutional. "2
The court then discussed the retroactivity of its ruling." The
court found that giving the Holmberg ruling retroactive effect would
not protect the separation of Powers any more than a prospective
application would protect it." In addition, retroactive application
would "swamp" the district courts with litigants whose cases were
determined by orders of administrative law judges.1 5 The court
decided that the Holmberg ruling was to be applied prospectively,
except that it was to apply to the parties in the Holmberg case."
6
Finally, the court decided to stay its decision until July 1, 1999, to
give the "legislature time to amend the laws in accordance with this
decision. '"
D. Minnesota Appellate Court Finds No Attorney-Client Relationship
Between a Minnesota County and a Child of Recipient of Public
Assistance"'
In 1979, Julie Gramling gave birth to Misty Jo Gramling." 9
When Misty Jo was four months old, St. Louis County arranged for
paternity testing as part of paternity proceedings. 20 The paternity
test erroneously excluded Joseph Jerulle as the father.
2'
In 1996, St. Louis County initiated a second round of paternity
proceedings.122 As part of this paternity proceeding, MistyJo, Julie
112. See id. As part of its analysis, the court rejected the appellants' insistence
that the court follow the separation of powers test outlined in Breimhorst v.
Beckman, in which the central principles are efficiency, public policy and the
availability of judicial review. See Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 420, 35
N.W.2d 719, 734 (1949). However, the court noted that judicial review does not
provide enough judicial oversight of this process to justify its seemingly efficient
advantages. See HolmbergI, 588 N.W.2d at 726.
113. See Holmberg II, 588 N.W.2d at 726-27.
114. See id. at 727.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Id. The court relied on Northern Pipeline Construction Co v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co. for its authority to stay its decision. See id. (citing Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982)).
118. See Gramling v. Memorial Blood Centers of Minn., 601 N.W.2d 457, 461
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
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Gramling and Joseph Jerulle again underwent a paternity test.' 3
The results of the test indicated that Joseph Jerulle was Misty Jo's•• 124
biological father with a 99.99% probability.
In 1998, Misty Jo sued St. Louis County for legal malpractice
for "negligent failure to establish her paternity" in the original 1979
paternity test. 25  The district court granted St. Louis County's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Misty Jo had
not established the existence of an attorney-client relationship with
St. Louis County.
2 6 MistyJo appealed. 117
The appellate court addressed the issue of the creation of an
attorney-client relationship between Misty Jo and St. Louis Count
under both the contract and the tort theories of representation.
The court stated that "[u]nder the contract theory of
representation, the parties to the alleged attorney-client
relationship must have either explicitly or implicitly agreed to a,,.129
contract for legal services. Misty Jo alleged that an express
contract existed when Julie Gramling "executed an assignment of
support in order to obtain public assistance."3 0 However, the court
noted that federal law requires each AFDC applicant to sign an• 131
assignment of support clause. The assignment arises as by an
operation of law and not by the execution of the assignment
provision. 2 The court concluded that St. Louis County was merely
fulfilling a statutory mandate, and the fulfillment of this mandate




124. See id. (stating that after Misty Jo initiated her lawsuit against the county,
an additional paternity test confirmed the 99.99% probability of Joseph Jerulle




128. See id. at 459-60. The court began its discussion by stating the elements of
a claim of legal malpractice as follows: "(1) the existence of an attorney-client
relationship; (2) that defendant breached the contract or acted negligently; (3)
that the breach or negligence proximately caused plaintiff's damages; and (4) but
for' the attorney's conduct, the plaintiff would have been successful in the
prosecution of the underlying claim." Id. at 459 (citing Togstad v. Vesely, Otto,
Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Minn. 1980)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. (citing Iverson v. Schulte, 367 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985)).
132. See id.
133. See id. (stating that MistyJo was alleging that the express contract created
2000] 1325
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In addition, the court quickly dispensed of any implied
contract for legal services claim.3 First, the court noted that
neither Misty Jo nor Julie Gramling ever requested legal
representation and that the county attorney never agreed to
represent' Misty Jo or Julie Gramling. Second, the court noted
that "a party's mere expectation that an attorney will represent him
or her is insufficient to create an attorney-client relationship."
3 6
The court concluded that, despite a "mere expectation" by either
Misty Jo or Julie Gramling, no implicit attorney-client relationship




The court then analyzed the existence of an attorney-client
relationship under the tort theory. The court noted that under a
tort theory, "an attorney-client relationship is created whenever an
individual seeks and receives legal advice from an attorney in
circumstances in which a reasonable person would rely on such
advice." 13 9  The district court found that Julie Gramling never
sought legal advice from the county. 40 As a result, the appellate
court concluded that one of the essential elements of the creation
of an attorney-client relationship under the tort theory was missing
and that no attorney-client relationship existed between Julie
Gramling and St. Louis County on behalf of MistyJo. "'
Finally, the appellate court addressed MistyJo's claim that two
statutes established an affirmative duty on the part of the county to1 • 142
accurately determine her paternity. Minnesota Statute section
257.175 states that it is the "duty of the commissioner of public
welfare to promote the enforcement of all laws for the protection
of defective, illegitimate, dependent, neglected, and delinquent
children.., and to take the initiative in all matters involving the
interests of such children where adequate provisions therefore has




136. Id. at 460 (citing Spannaus v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, 368
N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. Id. (quoting TJD Dissolution Corp. v. Savoie Supply Co., 460 N.W.2d 59,
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not already been made."'43 In addition, Minnesota Statute section
257.33 states that it is the "duty of the commissioner of public
welfare... to take care that the interests of the child are
safeguarded, that appropriate steps are taken to establish his
paternity .... 144
The court noted that neither Minnesota Statute section
257.175 nor section 257.33 affirmatively "require[d] the county to
conclusively establish paternity.'4 4 The only duty of the county was
146to represent the state's interest in paternity actions. In addition,
the court noted that even if the original paternity test correctly
identified Misty Jo's father, Minnesota Statute section 257.33
allowed the county the discretion not to proceed with a paternity
action. 14 As a result, the appellate court held that the county was
under no statutory duty to correctly establish MistyJo's paternity.
48
Because the appellate court found no attorney-client
relationship and no statutory duty to establish paternity, the court
affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment for St.
Louis County.
149
E. Eighth Circuit Rules that Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Challenges to
the Board of Immigration Appeal's Determinations and Denies Wife's
Petition to Grant Resident Status to Alien Husband
15 °
On November 23, 1993, Ali Sabhari entered the United States
on a six-month, non-immigrant, visitor's visa.15 1 Sabhari's visa
expired on May 25, 1994 and he remained in the United StatesS152
illegally. At this time, Sabhari was legally married to Khadijah
Mohammed, who was in Kuwait during the majority of Sabhari's
stay in the United States.
153
Despite his existing marriage, Sabhari became romantically
143. MINN. STAT. § 257.175 (1978).
144. Id. § 257.33.
145. Gramling, 460 N.W.2d at 461.
146. See id.
147. See id; see also MINN. STAT. § 257.254.
148. See Gramling, 460 N.W.2d at 461.
149. See id.
150. See Sabhari v. Reno, 197 F.3d 938, 943-44 (8th Cir. 1999).
151. See id. at 940. Ali Sabhari was a citizen of Kuwait. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. Sabhari and Mohammed had four children. See id. Mohammed
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involved with Susan Sherry in the fall of 1994.154 On June 18, 1995,
approximately eight months after Sabhari met Sherry, Sabhari
obtained a proxy divorce from Mohammed.155 Sabhari and Sherry
were married in July 1995, four weeks after Sabhari obtained the
divorce from Mohammed. 
56
On July 31, 1995, Sherry filed a visa petition requesting the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to classify Sabhari as
a relative of a United States citizen. 15  The INS conducted an
investigation, which included reviewing supporting documents
provided by Sabhari and Sherry, and interviewing the couple
regarding the nature of their relationship.1 58  As part of its
investigation, the INS interviewed Mohammed, who told the INS
that she and Sabhari agreed to divorce and remarry once Sabhari
received permanent residency in the United States.159 Mohammed
stated that Sabhari had come to the United States in order to
become a citizen and that both Mohammed and Sabhari had kept
160the divorce a secret from their children. In addition, Sabhari's
sister, brother and sister-in-law each wrote unsolicited letters to the
INS corroborating Mohammed's explanation.
6
1
As a result of the discovery of this evidence, the INS denied
Sherry's petition and refused to classify Sabhari as a relative of a
United States citizen. 62  The District Director of the INS
determined that Sabhari "had failed to show his marriage to Sherry
was entered by both parties on good faith. " "'
Sherry appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
which affirmed the INS decision. 64  The BIA determined that
"Sherry presented insufficient evidence to 'overcome the evidence
of fraud raised by the record'-evidence which suggested that
Sabhari 'contrived to remarry his ex-wife after having acquired







159. See id. at 940-41.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 944.
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Sherry and Sabhari then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota requesting that the court
compel the INS to approve Sherry's petition for Sabhari's
reclassification. 166  Both parties filed motions for summary
judgment and the district court granted the INS's motion for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and on the merits.167 Sabhari and
Sherry appealed the district court's decision to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals.' 68
The appellate court first addressed the jurisdiction issue. f69
The appellate court noted that the only plausible jurisdictional
theory raised by the Sherry and Sabhari was 8 U.S.C. section
1329. 17 Section 1329 states in part,
The district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, brought by the
United States that arise under the provisions of this
subchapter.... Nothing in this section shall be construed
as providing jurisdiction for suits against the United States
or its agencies or officers.
17
,
The district court held that the language in section 1329
provided a basis forjurisdiction over the lawsuit filed by Sherry and
Sabhari because it was instituted against an officer of the United
States. 172
The appellate court agreed with the district court's
interpretation, but the appellate court added that "it [wa]s clear
that § 1329 does nothing to foreclose any other jurisdictional
mechanism .... ,173  The appellate court noted that "the phrase
'nothing in this section shall be construed [to provide] jurisdiction'
does not preclude jurisdiction under other provisions of law."
174




169. See id. at 94143.
170. See Sabhari, 197 F.3d at 941; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (Supp. III 1997).
171. 8 U.S.C. § 1329.
172. See Sabhari, 197 F.3d at 942 (citing Sabhari v. Reno, No. 97-1534 (D. Minn.
Aug. 21, 1996)). Sabhari and Sherry filed suit against Janet Reno, Attorney
General of the United States, and Curtis Aljets, Acting District Director of the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. See id. at 938.
173. See id. at 942.
174. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1329).
2000] 1329
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under section 1329, 8 U.S.C. § 1 252(g) strips the district court of its
jurisdiction nonetheless.'75 Section 1252(g) provides:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding
any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction
to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders against any aliens under this
chapter.
1 76
However, the appellate court noted that section 125 2(g) has
been read narrowly and precisely by both the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals itself and the United States Supreme Court.17 7 The
United States Supreme Court had held that section 1252(s) only
applied in specific instances that arose in deportation cases. The
appellate court ruled that because Sabhari was not involved in any
deportation process, section 125 2(g) did not apply to this case.'79
Finally, the court noted that under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), "final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.'
8
1
In addition, the APA provides that "person[s] suffering a legal
wrong because of agency action... [are] entided to judicial review,,181
thereof. On that basis, the appellate court noted that federal
question jurisdiction under section 1331112 for actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States in
conjunction with the waiver of the government's sovereign
immunity in the APA was enough to provide jurisdiction for the
case at issue. 83 The appellate court ruled that the district court did
175. See id.
176. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (Supp. III 1997).
177. See Sabhari, 197 F.3d at 942 (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm'n., 525 U.S. 471, 474 (1999) (holding that section 1252(g)
only applies to specific actions of the Attorney General undertaken in the
deportation process)); Shah v. Reno, 184 F.3d 718, 722 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting
that section 1252 (g) does not proscribe review over even general deportation
matters).
178. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm'n., 525 U.S. at 474.
179. See Sabhari, 197 F.3d at 942.
180. Id. at 943; see also 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
181. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
183. See Sabhari, 197 F.3d at 943.
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20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/16
FAMILY LAW
have jurisdiction to decide the Sherry and Sabhari case on the
merits."8
Next, the appellate court proceeded to review the merits of theS 185
Sabhari and Sherry complaint. The court reviewed the process
by which an alien may become a United States citizen after
186marrying a United States citizen. The court stated that "it has
long been recognized that the INS may combat fraud by refusing to
confer benefits where a marriage has been entered so as to
circumvent the immigration laws. "I 7
The court noted that conflicting evidence existed regarding
the propriety of the Sherry and Sabhari marriage but that
substantial evidence indicated that Sabhari married Sherry for the
188purpose of becoming a United States citizen. In making this
conclusion, the court emphasized the testimony of Mohammed,
the testimony of Sabhari's relatives, and the fact that Sabhari had
looked into several ways of becoming a United States citizen before
settling on a scheme to marry a citizen.
89
As a result, the appellate court determined that the district
court had ample evidence upon which to base its dismissal of the
action. 9  The appellate court therefore affirmed the summary
judgment in favor of the INS and remanded the judgment to show• . 191
that it is dismissed with prejudice.
Tiernee L. Nelsen
184. See id.
185. See id. at 943-44.
186. See id. (referencing the following statutes: 8 U.S.C. § 1154, 8 U.S.C. §
1151(b) (2)(A)(I) and 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)).
187. See id. at 943 (citing Lutwak v. United States, 334 U.S. 604, 611 (1953)).
188. See id. at 944. The court noted that the Sherry and Sabhari presented
testimony recalling the history of their relationship and financial records to
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